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Dynamic Evaluation of Job Search Assistance
* 
 
This paper evaluates a job search assistance program for unemployment insurance 
recipients. The assignment to the program is dynamic. We provide a discussion on dynamic 
treatment effects and identification conditions. In the empirical analyses we use 
administrative data from a unique institutional environment. This allows us to compare 
different microeconometric evaluation estimators. All estimators find that the job search 
assistance program reduces the exit to work, in particular when provided early during the 
spell of unemployment. Furthermore, continuous-time (timing-of-events and regression 
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Since the 1990s, many countries oﬀer job search assistance to stimulate the exit to
work of unemployed workers. Policymakers often consider this to be a necessary
requirement in a system with relatively generous beneﬁts. In their recent survey,
Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) stress that job search assistance programs often have
relatively good short-run eﬀects. Also in the Netherlands job search assistance is
oﬀered frequently. In fact, the Netherlands is one of four OECD countries spend-
ing more than one percent of GDP on active labor market programs (see OECD,
2010). However, empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of Dutch active labor mar-
ket programs is very limited, which is particularly true for job search assistance
programs. In this paper, we focus on job search assistance for unemployed workers
in the Dutch primary education sector. As outcome variable we consider the exit
from unemployment, which is also the key variable of interest to policymakers. Fo-
cussing, for example, on wages is less interesting since a majority of the unemployed
teachers return to a job in the primary school sector where wages are determined
by collective bargaining and are almost a deterministic function of the individual’s
age (with some extras for managerial responsibilities).
In the Netherlands, the use of randomized social experiments in social insurance
schemes is uncommon. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) describe the
most recent experiment conducted in 1998/99. In our paper, we deal with non-
experimental data, which makes the empirical evaluation non-trivial. First, the
evaluation of job search assistance suﬀers from the usual selection problem that
participation might be related to (unobserved) individual characteristics. Second,
job search assistance often does not start immediately after an individual enters
unemployment, and the start of the program diﬀers between individuals. When
staying unemployed suﬃciently long, all individuals will eventually enter job search
assistance, which complicates the evaluation (see Abbring and Heckman, 2007; for
a survey on dynamic treatment evaluation). Some individuals have already left
unemployment at the moment they should enter job search assistance. Dynamic
selection complicates the construction of a comparable control group.
Even though we only evaluate a single treatment, the eﬀects can diﬀer between
individuals. Not only because individuals are heterogeneous, but also because the
impact of the program can depend on the moment of starting job search assistance.
For example, lock-in eﬀects may be more substantial for unemployed workers with
relatively favorable labor market prospects (or those who are still relatively short-
term unemployed). We investigate to what extent the timing of entering job search
assistance aﬀects its eﬀectiveness. Obviously, this is informative about the targeting
eﬃciency of the program and such knowledge may improve the proﬁling of unem-
1ployed workers. In the current policy debate this issue becomes more important. In
the next few years the Dutch government is facing substantial budget cuts, which
will aﬀect the expenditures on active labor market programs.
In our empirical analyses, we use administrative data from a unique institu-
tional environment in which the assignment to job search assistance is very clearly
described, and allows for diﬀerent evaluation methods. The participation in job
search assistance depends only on a limited set of observable characteristics, and
there are some clear discontinuities. We exploit this when estimating the eﬀect of
job search assistance using propensity score matching and regression discontinuity
estimators. We compare the results of these estimators to assessing the program’s
eﬀectiveness using the timing-of-events estimator. Because the institutional envi-
ronment guarantees that the underlying assumptions of the diﬀerent estimators are
satisﬁed, we obtain valuable insights in the performance (in a real life setting) of
some of the most popular cross-sectional estimators for policy evaluation used in
recent microeconometric research.
In the US, interventions during unemployment often start at a ﬁxed moment,
e.g. Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003) study training services starting after
two weeks of unemployment. A substantial share of the econometric methodology,
therefore, focuses on static treatment evaluation (e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009;
for a recent survey). However, in many European countries the timing of entry into
labor market programs often varies between individuals. Other than in the Nether-
lands, this is, for example, the case in Sweden (e.g. Fredriksson and Johansson,
2008; and Sianesi, 2004), Switzerland (e.g. Gerﬁn and Lechner, 2002; and Lalive,
Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller, 2008), France (Cr´ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den
Berg, 2010), and Germany (Lechner and Wunsch, 2009). A relatively large liter-
ature attempts to ﬁt such a dynamic setting into the standard potential outcome
model (e.g. Gerﬁn and Lechner, 2002; and Sianesi, 2004). Sianesi (2004) discusses
the complications of ﬁnding a suitable control group in case all individuals will even-
tually enter a program. Considering those individuals who are observed not to have
received treatment implies conditioning on future outcomes. Fredriksson and Jo-
hansson (2008) argue that not accounting for dynamic selection may bias treatment
evaluation estimators.
This paper ﬁts within the recently growing literature on dynamic treatment
evaluation, surveyed by Abbring and Heckman (2007). The contribution is not
only empirical, but by comparing diﬀerent methods we also intend to make some
methodological contributions. We discuss the implementation of various estimators
in a dynamic setting, and show that all dynamic evaluation methods rely on assum-
ing that individuals do not anticipate the exact start of treatment. Empirical studies
using the timing-of-events methodology often explicitly justify this assumption (e.g.
2Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 2004), but this is ignored in studies
using other evaluation estimators. Propensity score matching methods mainly focus
on the conditional independence assumption, which is often justiﬁed from the rich-
ness of the data. Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002) and Sianesi (2004), for example, argue
that information on past labor market outcomes and subjective assessments of la-
bor market prospects justify the conditional independence assumption. Lalive, Van
Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2008) show that even if such information is available, applying
timing-of-events estimation and propensity score matching estimation give substan-
tially diﬀerent results. Unlike our institutional setting, in their setting it is unclear
whether the conditional independence assumption is valid. Additionally, we apply
regression-discontinuity estimation. The implementation of regression-discontinuity
estimation in a dynamic setting is non-standard mainly because forward-looking in-
dividuals might take into account the timing of entering the program when deciding
about their job search strategy (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). We follow Ab-
bring and Van den Berg (2005) when applying regression-discontinuity estimation.
As far as we know this paper is the ﬁrst using the regression-discontinuity estimator
for duration models in an empirical application.
In the empirical application we mainly focus on the ex-post eﬀects of job search
assistance, which are the causal eﬀects of actually entering the program. Using the
content and the goal of the program we try to decompose this ex-post eﬀect into
a lock-in eﬀect and an improvement in job search. In particular, we exploit that
job search assistance is most intensive during the ﬁrst eight weeks. Most treatment
evaluation estimators are not informative on ex-ante eﬀects, which are the eﬀects of
being enrolled in a beneﬁts scheme which includes an active labor market program
compared to a scheme without this particular program. When applying regression-
discontinuity we compare individuals who should enter the program quickly after
becoming unemployed with those who enter later during the spell of unemployment.
By comparing reemployment rates between both groups before actually entering the
program, we can get some idea about the threat eﬀect of the program which provides
some insight in the size of possible ex-ante eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide details about the
relevant unemployment insurance scheme, and the job search assistance program.
Section 3 presents the data. In Section 4 we provide a general framework for dynamic
treatment evaluation. We discuss timing-of-events estimation in Section 5. Section
6 deals with propensity score methods, and Section 7 presents the results from
regression discontinuity estimation. In section 8 we compare the results from the
diﬀerent methods. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
32 Institutional setting
2.1 Unemployment insurance for the primary education sec-
tor
Our data concern former employees of Dutch primary education institutions who
are entitled to collecting unemployment insurance beneﬁts. Primary education in-
stitutions, like all public sector institutions, must bear their own unemployment in-
surance risk. However, because primary education institutions are relatively small,
they were forced in 1996 to participate in a sector fund, called the Participation
Fund. This fund is responsible for collecting premiums, and paying unemployment
insurance beneﬁts.
Unemployed workers from the primary education sector have the same entitle-
ment rules and obligations as unemployed workers from the private sector. Their
beneﬁts are, however, more generous both in terms of level and entitlement period.
All individuals below age 65 who worked at least 26 weeks of the 36 weeks prior to
becoming unemployed are entitled to collecting unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
Furthermore, a worker should have lost at least ﬁve working hours per week or more
than 50% of their weekly working hours (if less than 10). Finally, the job loss should
not be voluntary, and the individual should not be held responsible for the job loss.
Each unemployed worker receives unemployment insurance beneﬁts for at least
three months. If an unemployed worker worked at least 52 days during four out of
the past ﬁve calendar years (‘year’-condition), the entitlement period is extended
to six months. For each additional year of employment (so beyond four years) the
entitlement period for unemployment insurance beneﬁts is extended by one month.
For an entitlement period of one year, the unemployed worker must have worked
for at least ten years. For the maximum entitlement period of 38 months, 36 years
of work is required. During the ﬁrst year, the beneﬁts level is 78% of the last wage
(capped at 167.70 euro per day). After that, the beneﬁts level decreases to 70% of
this last wage.
After the usual beneﬁts entitlement period ends, an individual may be entitled
to extended beneﬁts at 70% of the last wage. The duration of the extended beneﬁts
depends on age and work experience. Individuals below age 40 and those with less
than ﬁve years of work experience do not receive extended beneﬁts. A 40-year old
individual with ﬁve years of work experience receives one additional year of beneﬁts,
while a 51-year old with more than ten years of work experience receives extended
beneﬁts until reaching the retirement age of 65.
Beneﬁt recipients have the obligation to actively search for work, and to accept
suitable job oﬀers. Furthermore, they should provide all necessary information to
4the Participation Fund, and keep them informed about possible changes in their
situation (e.g. vacation, sickness, pregnancy, etc.). If the individuals fails to comply
to these rules, a sanction can be applied which leads to a temporary reduction of
the beneﬁts level.
Over the last few years, the unemployment rate in the primary education sector
was about 2% compared to 4% in the private sector. The main reason for the
lower unemployment rate is a much lower inﬂow. The outﬂow from unemployment
in the primary education sector is comparable to that of the private sector. There
are compositional diﬀerences between unemployed workers in the primary education
sector and the private sector. About 80% of the workers in primary education are
women, and the average age is somewhat higher than in the private sector.
2.2 The job search assistance program
Since July 2005, institutions in the public sector are also responsible for reinte-
grating their former employees. This implies that the Participation Fund became
responsible for ﬁnancing and organizing active labor market programs. These ac-
tivities fall into two categories. First, a regular program in which the majority of
the beneﬁt recipients participate. This program focusses on job applications, but
can also include some vocational training. Second, a short job search assistance
program focussing on networking skills in addition to job application training. Un-
employed workers under age 60 are obliged to participate in these programs if these
are oﬀered to them. Individuals who refuse to participate will be sanctioned with
a substantial reduction of their beneﬁts. Participation in a program does not aﬀect
the entitlement to beneﬁts, i.e. the beneﬁt entitlement period is not extended and
individuals do not get additional beneﬁts while being in the job search assistance
program. Most individuals aim at ﬁnding new work again in the primary education
sector, but about one-third of the observed exits are towards employment outside
this sector.
The program is only provided to individuals who receive beneﬁts for at least eight
hours per week, and with an entitlement period exceeding three month. Individuals
with less than 13 months entitlement at the moment of entering the program are
assigned to the short program. Individuals with a longer entitlement period enter
the regular program. The timing of assignment to the program diﬀers depending
on an age criteria. Individuals above age 50 (at the ﬁrst day of unemployment)
and (low-skilled) individuals who were previously employed in a subsidized job,
should enter the job search assistance program immediately after starting collecting
beneﬁts. Individuals under age 50 and who are not low-skilled, enter the program
only after six months of unemployment.
5Only 8% of all job search assistance programs oﬀered are short programs. These
services last three months and focus on presentation, writing a vitae and application
letter, networking and eﬃcient job search. The remaining 92% of the job search
assistance programs oﬀered are regular programs. In the empirical analyses we will
not distinguish between both programs. The programs are oﬀered at 11 locations
providing all the same program. Once invited the beneﬁt recipients can choose the
location but 75% of the individuals accept the default. The remaining 25% almost
always opt for the location nearest to their home.
The regular program starts with an intake interview to determine the required
activities. These range from improving language skills, providing psychological sup-
port, providing short vocational class, and oﬀering the type of job search assistance
services also included in the short program. The training takes place both in indi-
vidual and group meetings. The intensity of the meetings depends upon the needs
of the individual. The ﬁrst weeks are often more intense, with two to three meetings
per week with training oﬃcers. The total time spend in these meetings is about
one full working day per week. After this period, the participants usually visit the
training center once a week or every other week for a few hours. During this later
stage, participants receive weekly assignments to be discussed in the weekly meet-
ings. The general goal is that after two months of participating in the program
individuals should start making successful job applications. However, participation
in the program does not lower the job search requirements. While in the job search
assistance program, unemployed workers must comply to the same minimum job ap-
plications requirements as when not being in the program. The job search assistance
program should not last longer than one year, and individuals who start a new job
during the program are oﬀered to ﬁnish the program while working. The cost of the
short job search assistance program is 500 euro per individual entering the program.
The cost of the regular job search assistance program is 4000 euro for individuals
above age 50 and for low-skilled individuals, and 3750 euro for individuals below
age 50.
The Participation Fund does not assign beneﬁt recipients directly to programs,
but outsources this task to a separate ﬁrm. This ﬁrm never has any personal contact
with unemployed workers and receives only a limited amount of information when
assigning them to treatment. The information consists of the social security number,
gender, age, an indication for being low-skilled (i.e. previously in a subsidized job),
entitlement duration to beneﬁts, number of weekly hours of collecting beneﬁts, and
an indicator code for the previous employer.1 Two weeks prior to the start of
the program the individual receives a letter explaining that she should enroll in a
1The policy is to avoid having individuals previously employed at the same institution in the
same meeting groups.
6program. This letter also oﬀers individuals to select one of the 11 locations.
In practice the policy guidelines concerning the timing of entering job search
assistance were not followed strictly. This was due to administrative and commu-
nication issues between the Participation Fund and the external ﬁrm.2 There are
cases where records got lost, where information was provided too late, and where
notiﬁcation letters were never sent. As we will show in the next section, this creates
substantial variation in the assignment of the program. And, since the external ﬁrm
never had any contact with beneﬁt recipients, the variation in program assignment
should be exogenous conditional on observed individual characteristics. We exploit
the latter in the empirical analyses.
3 Data
In the empirical analyses we use administrative data from the Participation Fund.
Our data concern all former employees from primary education institutions who
started collecting unemployment insurance beneﬁts between August 1, 2006 and
April 1, 2008. Individuals are followed until their beneﬁts entitlement ends (due to
ﬁnding work or having exhausted their entitlement period) or until March 12, 2009.
From the data we only consider those individuals who started collecting beneﬁts
within 30 days after being laid-oﬀ. According to the job search assistance program
criteria, we leave out individuals who claimed beneﬁts for less than eight hours per
week. We also exclude individuals above age 60 since for them participation in the
job search assistance program is voluntary.
From the data we drop three individuals who very often entered and exited
unemployment during the observation period. We exclude 43 observations for which
the date of entering the job search assistance program was unknown or prior to
becoming unemployed. The latter might occur if the individual was still in the
program from an earlier unemployment spell. Finally, we exclude 37 observations
with an hourly wage in the previous job below three euro, which is far below the
legally binding minimum wage.
The data contain 3064 individuals for which we only consider the ﬁrst observed
unemployment spell. Over 60% of the individuals are entitled to beneﬁts for more
than one year, and 40% have an entitlement period exceeding two years. As can be
seen from Figure 1 almost 50% of the inﬂow occurs in August, which is the start
of a new school year. The outﬂow in much more spread over the year, although
2In the Netherlands, all individuals applying for unemployment insurance beneﬁts should apply
at the nationwide UI administration. This administration forwards ﬁles of workers from the primary
education sector to the Participation Fund, which already causes a delay ranging from a few days
to a few weeks.
7Figure 1: Seasonal variation in entry into and exit from unemployment.
there is a decreasing trend over the school year. Figure 2a provides a Kaplan-
Meier estimate for the exit to work. The median unemployment duration is about
21 weeks. Of the 3064 individuals, 862 entered the regular job search assistance
program and 78 the short program. Figure 2b shows the Kaplan-Meier estimate for
entering a program. In the ﬁgure we distinguish two groups, those who should enter
a program immediately (either older than 50 or low-skilled), and those who should
enter after six months of unemployment (below 50 and not low-skilled). The ﬁgure
clearly shows that the latter group enters the program, on average, later during
the unemployment spell. Nevertheless, within each group there is still substantial
variation in the moment of entering. This conﬁrms that the external ﬁrm did not
manage to correctly implement the rules for program assignment.
The data contain a limited set of individual characteristics. In Table 1 we provide
some descriptive statistics. We distinguish between individuals who participated in
a program during unemployment (participants) and those who did not (nonparti-
cipants). The data contain the same individual characteristics as provided to the
external ﬁrm who assigned the program. The participants are, on average, unem-
ployed for more hours per week, and have a higher beneﬁts level. This might be the
direct consequence of the diﬀerence in age structure. Older workers are more likely
to participate in a program, which follows the policy of assigning the programs. Of
course, the diﬀerent composition between the participants and the nonparticipants
8Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates.
(a) Exit to work. (b) Entering job search assistance.
is not only the result of the assignment mechanism and the implementation of the
external ﬁrm. Dynamic selection also plays an important role. Those individuals
with adverse characteristics have, on average, longer unemployment durations and
are thus more likely to have entered the job search assistance at some stage.
4 Model for dynamic treatment evaluation
In this section we brieﬂy discuss a model for dynamic treatment evaluation. Our
discussion ﬁts within the more general discussion provided by Abbring and Heck-
man (2007). We highlight some issues relevant for actually estimating the dynamic
treatment eﬀects in our setting. In the next sections we apply diﬀerent estimation
methods, and provide a comparison of the empirical results.
4.1 Theoretical framework
Consider the case where we observe for each individual the duration T > 0 of
unemployment. We deﬁne the binary variables Yt as indicators for being unemployed
(Yt = 0) or employed (Yt = 1) after t periods, so Yt = I(T ≤ t). This outcome
variable describes the survival in unemployment, so E[Yt] = 1 − ¯ S(t), where ¯ S(t) is
the survivor function Pr(T > t).
We focus on a situation in which individuals can receive a single treatment only
once during the period of unemployment. All individuals in the data are eligible
for entering treatment. However, the timing at which individuals receive treatment
diﬀers. Let S > 0 denote the elapsed unemployment duration at the moment of
entering treatment. Individuals might actually leave unemployment before starting
9Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Program Non-
participants participants
Number of observations 940 2124
Median unemployment duration (in days) 369 96
Median duration to program start (in days) 156
Unemployment hours per week 29.9 26.7
Beneﬁts level (hourly) e12.8 e10.4
Female 64% 85%
Age 20-35 9% 59%
Age 35-50 46% 29%
Age 50-65 45% 12%
Low-skilled 34% 4%
treatment. Let D be a variable describing actual participation in treatment, D =
I(S < T).
Ideally, one should measure the eﬀect of treatment at time period S on the resid-
ual unemployment duration (T − S|T > S). This can easily be translated into a
cost-beneﬁt analysis in which the treatment costs are compared to expected changes
in future beneﬁts payments. Furthermore, considering this treatment eﬀect for dif-
ferent values of S is useful for improving the targeting of treatment to unemployed
workers. However, data usually describe a limited observation period, so long un-
employment durations are censored. The lack of observations in the right tail of
the distribution of unemployment spells implies that we cannot estimate average
durations. Instead, we focus on whether or not someone is still unemployed some
period after providing treatment.
Let Y ∗
1,t(s) denote the potential unemployment status after t periods if the in-
dividual was treated after s periods. So even though we only consider a single
treatment, it may have diﬀerent eﬀects when applied at diﬀerent time periods. We






0) if s 6= s
0 ∀t < s,s
0
There is thus no causal dependence of outcomes on future treatments. This is the
no-anticipation assumption described by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) and also
adopted by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008). No-anticipation rules out that, prior
to the actual start of treatment, unemployed workers already change their job search
behavior in response to being assigned to treatment. This rules out threat eﬀects
as, for example, measured by Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003). In their case
10unemployed workers are more likely to leave the beneﬁts program once the have been
informed about the actual start of a job search assistance program. A similar result
is found by Cr´ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den Berg (2010). However, imposing
no-anticipation does not rule out ex-ante eﬀects of the treatment. Individuals may
know that they are exposed to the risk of having to participate in some treatment,
and may, therefore, behave diﬀerently than in a system in which the treatment is
absent. Justifying the no-anticipation assumption requires knowledge about the
unemployed worker’s information about participation in treatment prior to actually
starting the treatment. In our case, the unemployed workers are informed (by letter)
two weeks prior to the start of the job search assistance program. Our data contain
some information about these letters which we exploit to justify the no-anticipation
assumption (see the next subsection).
In a dynamic setting it is not immediately clear what the relevant counterfactual
is. The most natural counterfactual is to consider the potential outcome Y ∗
0,t, which
is the outcome if the unemployed worker would not receive treatment prior to t.
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0,t|S = s,Ys = 0

with t > s
This treatment eﬀect denotes the eﬀect of providing treatment at s on exit to work
between s and t for those who were still unemployed at s. This is the ex-post eﬀect
of the treatment, so the eﬀect of actually participating in the treatment on future
outcomes. It should be noted that almost all empirical microeconometric literature
focuses on ex-post eﬀects and ignores ex-ante eﬀects.
Unemployed workers treated at s are thus compared to unemployed workers who
(possibly) receive treatment after t. The main complication is that it is unclear
which individuals qualify for the control group. There is, of course, the selection
problem if treatment is not assigned randomly. However, an additional problem
is that in a setting with ongoing entry in treatment it is not possible to identify
which individuals did not receive treatment before t. In particular, for individuals
who left unemployment between s and t, it remains unobserved whether or not
they would have received treatment before or after t. It is unclear how to deal
with such observations. Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002) include these observations in the
control group, but exclude individuals who are observed to have received treatment
between s and t. This causes a bias towards shorter unemployment spells in the
control group, and treatment eﬀects will be underestimated. Ignoring both types
11of observations does not solve the issue either as there is no exit observed in the
control group between s and t.
Sianesi (2004) suggests to consider as potential control group all individuals who








1,t(> s)|S = s,Ys = 0

with t > s
where Y ∗
1,t(> s) is the potential employment outcome at t for an unemployed worker
not treated before or at s. This treatment eﬀect describes the eﬀect of entering
treatment at s compared to entering treatment at some later moment. The useful-
ness of this treatment eﬀect is limited, mainly because the counterfactual outcomes
and also the treatment eﬀect depend on the future entry process into treatment.
A cost-beneﬁt analysis, for example, is not straightforward since it is unclear when
individuals in the control group receive treatment.
Both approaches mentioned above to construct counterfactuals are mainly driven
by the requirement to ﬁt the evaluation problem within the standard (static) poten-
tial outcome model. Dynamic techniques can deal with such data problems more
ﬂexibly. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) use a duration model framework in which
they jointly model the length of the unemployment spell T and the time until entry
in treatment S. When imposing some functional form restrictions they can allow
for selection on unobservables. Both Lechner (2009) and Fredriksson and Johansson
(2008) discretize time and develop multi-period matching estimators assuming that
selection is only on observables. A more practical issue is the choice of the unit of a
time interval. In the next sections of this paper we discuss in more detail the appli-
cation of diﬀerent approaches to our data, and we compare the estimation results.
This should provide insight in the advantages and disadvantages of the diﬀerent
estimators.
4.2 Justifying no-anticipation
In the previous subsection we introduced the no-anticipation assumption. No-
anticipation implies that individuals do not change their behavior prior to entering
the program once they know the exact time of starting the program. If unemployed
workers receive information about the timing of entry in job search assistance far
before the actual start, they might take this into account in their current job search
decisions. Cr´ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den Berg (2010) use notiﬁcations to test
for anticipation of training programs. They ﬁnd strong eﬀects of the notiﬁcations
already before the start of the training program. In their setting the average time
between notiﬁcation and entry in the program is almost three months. Our data also
contain some information on invitation letters for the job search assistance program,
12which should be sent about two weeks prior to the start of job search assistance.
However, this information is very incomplete. Letters are only recorded since April
2008, so no information is available on the ﬁrst two years of the observation period.
There is also no guarantee that for the later period the information on the letters
is complete. In total we observe that 279 letters were sent. We observe only four
individuals who left unemployment in the two weeks prior to receiving the letter,
but no one in the short period after receiving the letter. Furthermore, the data show
that in almost all cases only 14 to 20 days elapsed between the sending of a letter
and the start of a job search assistance program. This provides evidence in favor of
the no-anticipation assumption in our setting.
The assumption of no-anticipation does not mean that individuals do not know
about the assignment rules for the job search assistance program. Unemployed
workers may be informed about the assignment rules. For example, an individual
above age 50 may know that she should enter the program as soon as possible, but
it is ruled out that individuals know the exact timing of entering the training. This
also implies that individuals cannot manipulate their assignment to the program.
Given the construction with the external agency assigning job search assistance, it
is unlikely that individuals can either manipulate or obtain prior knowledge about
their actual assignment. Unemployed workers do not know about the existence of




We start by considering the timing-of-events approach proposed by Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003) to estimate the eﬀect of participating in job search assistance
on exit from unemployment. This is a continuous-time method which allows for
selection on unobservables. The idea is to jointly model reemployment T and entry
into treatment S in a bivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model. Bonnal,
Foug` ere and Serandon (1997) use a similar model to estimate the eﬀect of job search
training, and Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of beneﬁts sanctions.
Consider an individual collecting unemployment insurance beneﬁts for t units of
time. We assume that the exit rate can be characterized by observed characteristics
x, unobserved characteristics vu, the elapsed unemployment duration t itself, and a
variable indicating whether the individual already started participating in the job
search assistance program I(s < t), where s is the moment at which an individual
13enters job search assistance. Furthermore, vu is assumed to be independent of x.
The exit rate from unemployment at t conditional on x, vu and s is denoted by
θu(t|x,vu,s), and follows the familiar mixed proportional hazard speciﬁcation
θu(t|x,vu,s) = λu(t)exp(x
0βu + δ · I(s < t) + vu)
in which λu(t) represents individual duration dependence.
The parameter δ describes the causal eﬀect of participating in the job search
assistance program. In the speciﬁcation above, this is a multiplicative eﬀect on the
exit rate from unemployment. In Subsection 5.3 we show how we use this model
to compute the dynamic treatment eﬀects ∆(t,s) described in the previous section.
In the model speciﬁcation above δ is a permanent eﬀect, which is the same for all
individuals. This is most likely too strong an assumption. In the next subsection
we allow δ to depend on individual characteristics x, the moment of starting the
job search assistance program s, and the elapsed duration of job search assistance
t − s.3
Recall that our data contain the same information as the external agency had
when assigning unemployed workers to job search assistance. If we include all in-
dividual characteristics known to this external agency in the vector x, then the
moment of entering the training s should be independent of unobservables vu. We
can test this by jointly modeling entry in the program and exit from unemployment.
Therefore, consider an individual who has received unemployment insurance beneﬁts
for t periods, and who did not start the job search assistance yet. The entry rate into
job search assistance at t conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics x
and vs is denoted by
θs(t|x,vs) = λs(t)exp(x
0βs + vs)
where x is again imposed to be independent of vs. In this model speciﬁcation, the
entry rate in the job search assistance program is conditionally independent of the
unobservables vu only if vs and vu are independent. When actually estimating the
model we allow for dependence between vu and vs via the joint distribution G(vu,vs),
and test for independence.
The identiﬁcation of the model framework is discussed at length in Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003). The identiﬁcation hinges on two key elements. First,
proportionality in the hazard rates is necessary to identify the joint distribution
of unobservables. This identiﬁcation requirement thus imposes a restriction on the
parametric speciﬁcation. Second, the no-anticipation assumption discussed in the
previous section is necessary. The model speciﬁes the treatment eﬀect as a change in
the exit rate from unemployment at the start of the job search assistance program.
3Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) show that it is also possible to allow δ to depend on
unobserved characteristics v.
14The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. We, therefore,
parameterize the duration dependence functions and the bivariate unobserved het-
erogeneity distribution using ﬂexible speciﬁcations. We take both λu(t) and λs(t) to








where j is a subscript for time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying dummy variables
for each of the consecutive time intervals. Note that with an increasing number
of time intervals any duration dependence pattern can be approximated arbitrarily
closely.
We take the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms vu and vs to
be bivariate discrete with unrestricted mass-point locations for each term. Allowing





distribution of G(vu,vs) is
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with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1,...,4, and p4 = 1 − p1 − p2 − p3. In this case it is easy to
show that vu and vs are independent if and only if cov(vu,vs) = 0. The covariance
of vu and vs equals









In this case independence between vu and vs implies conditional independence be-
tween assignment to the job search assistance program and exit to work. It is always
possible to allow for more than two mass-point locations but, as we will show the
following section, the speciﬁcation above is suﬃciently ﬂexible for our purpose.
5.2 Parameter estimates
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for the timing-of-events model, both for the
full sample and for the sample excluding the low-skilled workers. In both cases the
eﬀect of participating in the job search assistance program is negative and signiﬁcant.
Entering the program reduces the probability of ﬁnding work. In the full sample
the exit rate from unemployment drops by about 29% = (exp(−0.338)−1), and by
about 36% for regular unemployed workers (excluding the low-skilled workers).
Low-skilled workers are less likely to exit unemployment and are signiﬁcantly
more likely to enter job search assistance. The latter is in agreement with the
assignment policy of the program. Women are less likely to ﬁnd work, but this is
15Table 2: Timing-of-events estimates.
Full sample No low-skilled
θu θs θu θs
Treatment (δ) −0.388∗∗ −0.443∗∗
(0.091) (0.105)
Low Skilled −0.918∗∗ 1.618∗∗
(0.096) (0.091)
Female −0.115∗ −0.119 −0.061 −0.133
(0.067) (0.075) (0.070) (0.095)
log(Wage) −0.527∗∗ 0.647∗∗ −0.507∗∗ 0.498∗∗
(0.055) (0.116) (0.057) (0.129)
Age/10 9.095∗∗ 77.850∗∗ 9.565∗∗ 78.668∗∗
(1.493) (1.356) (1.780) (1.756)
Age2/102 −4.293∗∗ −26.443∗∗ −4.590∗∗ −27.175∗∗
(0.519) (0.234) (0.652) (0.336)
Age3/103 0.813∗∗ 3.941∗∗ 0.884∗∗ 4.118∗∗
(0.081) (0.033) (0.106) (0.048)
Age4/104 −0.055∗∗ −0.216∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.229∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
Duration dependence
λ30−90 0.904∗∗ 2.582∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 2.563∗∗
(0.081) (0.364) (0.083) (0.515)
λ90−150 0.925∗∗ 3.420∗∗ 0.969∗∗ 3.342∗∗
(0.085) (0.362) (0.087) (0.511)
λ150−210 1.024∗∗ 3.538∗∗ 1.059∗∗ 3.693∗∗
(0.092) (0.365) (0.094) (0.514)
λ210−300 0.769∗∗ 3.613∗∗ 0.745∗∗ 3.795∗∗
(0.101) (0.366) (0.106) (0.514)
λ300−390 0.870∗∗ 3.337∗∗ 0.794∗∗ 3.637∗∗
(0.124) (0.383) (0.136) (0.526)
λ390−480 1.084∗∗ 2.439∗∗ 1.092∗∗ 2.476∗∗
(0.137) (0.478) (0.149) (0.634)
λ480−656 1.053∗∗ 2.128∗∗ 1.012∗∗ 2.111∗∗
(0.150) (0.537) (0.173) (0.695)
Unobserved heterogeneity
v1 −10.777∗∗ −96.475∗∗ −11.048∗∗ −96.020∗∗
(1.560) (2.430) (1.780) (3.064)











Note: ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
16only signiﬁcant in the full sample. The previous wage is negatively associated to
ﬁnding work and positively related to entering the job search assistance program.
We allow for a fourth-order polynomial in age. All terms have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
both on exit from unemployment and program participation.
Both in the exit rate and the entry in job search assistance, the duration depen-
dence pattern is relatively ﬂat beyond 30 days of collecting beneﬁts. This implies
that during the ﬁrst month of unemployment relatively few people ﬁnd work, but
later during the unemployment spell there is no decrease in the exit rate. The same
holds for the entry in job search assistance.
The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is concentrated at a single mass
point so there is no correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity vu in the exit
rate and the unobserved heterogeneity vs in the entry rate in job search assistance.
This conﬁrms that conditional on observed characteristics assignment to the program
is independent of the exit rate from unemployment, which is in agreement with the
process of assigning job search assistance as described in Subsection 2.2.4
We have tried including additional heterogeneity in the model. In particular, we
have tried including calender-time eﬀects and regional dummies. However, most of
the covariate eﬀects are insigniﬁcant and, more importantly, it did not change the
parameter estimates. The latter is particularly true for the eﬀects of participating
in job search assistance.
Imposing proportionality of the hazard rates might be too strong. Low-skilled
workers are very diﬀerent from regular unemployed workers. Furthermore, individ-
uals below and above age 50 have a diﬀerent pattern of entry into the program.
These diﬀerent duration dependence patterns will most likely not be captured by
a single dummy variable causing only a proportional shift in transition rates. To
allow for these diﬀerences, we estimate the model separately for low-skilled workers,
individuals above age 50 and those below age 50.
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for the three groups. The job search
assistance has a negative eﬀect on reemployment for all three groups but the eﬀect
is only signiﬁcant for the no low-skilled individuals. Furthermore, the negative eﬀect
is almost twice as large for individuals over age 50. Recall that individuals over age
50 should enter the job search assistance early while individuals below age 50 are
supposed to wait six months. To capture the timing of entrance into the program,
we interact the eﬀect of the program with the elapsed unemployment duration when
entering. Table 4 shows that for all groups job search assistance has the largest
negative eﬀect when the unemployed worker enters early, and that this adverse
eﬀect becomes smaller the later the individual enters the program.
4If we exclude some regressors from our model, estimation results actually show dependent
17Table 3: Timing-of-events estimates by group.
Only low-skilled No low-skilled No low-skilled
Over 50 Under 50
θu θs θu θs θu θs
Treatment (δ) −0.195 −0.875∗∗ −0.414∗∗
(0.285) (0.219) (0.148)
Female −0.469∗ −0.113 −0.120 −0.131∗∗ −0.040 0.156
(0.220) (0.159) (0.170) (0.045) (0.080) (0.167)
log(Wage) −1.408∗∗ 0.687∗ −0.481∗∗ 0.646∗∗ −0.507∗∗ 0.382∗
(0.332) (0.377) (0.197) (0.077) (0.062) (0.202)
Age/10 −24.256∗∗ −17.408∗∗ −49.799∗∗ 7.563∗∗ 32.359∗∗ −10.564
(9.252) (7.232) (4.440) (1.822) (3.130) (14.413)
Age2/102 8.285∗∗ 6.308∗∗ 30.951∗∗ −73.093∗∗ −15.122∗∗ 10.032∗
(2.366) (1.663) (2.731) (0.088) (1.343) (5.086)
Age3/103 −1.291∗∗ −0.978∗∗ −5.848∗∗ 17.472∗∗ 2.993∗∗ −2.654∗∗
(0.269) (0.131) (0.711) (0.010) (0.264) (0.804)
Age4/104 0.075∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.358∗∗ −1.183∗∗ −0.216∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.015) (0.003) (0.053) (0.003) (0.020) (0.049)
Duration dependence
λ30−90 0.542 3.860∗∗ 0.632∗ 2.456∗∗ 0.945∗∗ 0.000
(0.380) (0.631) (0.290) (0.518) (0.086)
λ90−150 −0.142 5.444∗∗ 1.159∗∗ 3.460∗∗ 0.949∗∗ 0.815∗
(0.440) (0.645) (0.306) (0.514) (0.091) (0.453)
λ150−210 0.282 5.266∗∗ 0.912∗∗ 3.571∗∗ 1.100∗∗ 2.861∗∗
(0.454) (0.650) (0.386) (0.521) (0.099) (0.358)
λ210−300 0.664 5.217∗∗ 0.779∗ 3.301∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 3.434∗∗
(0.453) (0.661) (0.454) (0.535) (0.112) (0.341)
λ300−390 0.958∗ 3.799∗∗ 1.014∗ 3.383∗∗ 0.806∗∗ 3.578∗∗
(0.470) (0.859) (0.521) (0.590) (0.152) (0.367)
λ390−480 0.837∗ 4.291∗∗ 1.302∗ 2.446∗ 1.129∗∗ 2.669∗∗
(0.492) (0.883) (0.569) (1.117) (0.171) (0.551)
λ480−656 0.976∗ 3.965∗∗ 1.382∗ 5.779∗∗ 0.997∗∗ 1.817∗∗
(0.483) (0.984) (0.666) (0.509) (0.209) (0.762)
Unobserved heterogeneity
v1 23.887∗ 9.592 −22.978 – −29.120∗∗ –
(12.548) (10.502) (18.764) (2.780)
v2 – 5.671 −30.912 335.300∗∗ – −16.007
(10.498) (5865.900) (6.521) (15.192)
p1 0.121∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.030) (–) (–)
p2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(–) (–) (–)
p3 0.879∗∗ 0.892 1.000
(0.030) (0.916) (–)
p4 0.000 0.108 0.000
(–) (0.916) (–)
Loglikelihood -3043.42 -3647.53 -12052.09
Observations 401 571 2092
Note: ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
18Table 4: Treatment eﬀect depends on timing start of program.
Treatment Eﬀect δ
Full Sample Low Skilled Over 50 no LS Under 50 no LS
Inﬂow within 4 months −0.678∗∗ −0.375 −1.194∗ −1.016∗
(0.138) (0.327) (0.556) (0.470)
Inﬂow 4 - 8 months −0.257∗∗ 0.039 −0.705 −0.425∗∗
(0.108) (0.306) (0.546) (0.176)
Inﬂow after 8 months −0.166 0.037 −0.220 −0.171
(0.175) (0.526) (0.615) (0.219)
Note: ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Lock-in eﬀects.
Treatment eﬀect δ
Full Sample Low skilled (LS) Over 50, not LS Under 50, not LS
δtLI≤60 −0.589∗∗ −0.406 −0.943∗∗ −0.540∗
(0.151) (0.383) (0.274) (0.234)
δ60<tLI≤365 −0.262∗∗ −0.086 −0.855∗∗ −0.286∗
(0.102) (0.310) (0.174) (0.163)
δ365<tLI −0.568∗∗ 0.014 −2.233∗∗ −0.972∗
(0.221) (0.458) (0.426) (0.562)
Note: ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
It is well known that job search assistance programs may cause lock-in eﬀects, i.e.
when being in the program individuals reduce their job search eﬀort. The objective
of the program was to prepare participants for making successful job applications
within two months, with the maximum length of the program year. To capture
locking-in, we allow the eﬀect of job search assistance to depend on the elapsed
duration in the program. We allow the program eﬀect to be diﬀerent during the
ﬁrst two months, between two months and one year and beyond one year. Table 5
shows that for regular unemployed workers the eﬀect of the program is negative at
any elapsed duration since the start of the program. This indicates that the negative
eﬀects which we found earlier are not only the consequence of a very large initial
lock-in eﬀect.
5.3 Treatment eﬀects
Within the timing-of-events model, the causal eﬀect of job search assistance describes
a proportional shift in the exit rate. This does not directly translate into a statistic
which is useful for policy purposes. Since the timing-of-events model provides a full
parametric speciﬁcation for the exit rate from unemployment and the entry into
job search assistance, we can compute the eﬀect of the program on the expected
unobserved heterogeneity.
19unemployment duration. However, this is unattractive since it requires extrapolating
the pattern of duration dependence beyond the observation period. Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw (2006) mention that expected unemployment durations are
very sensitive on the details of this extrapolation.
Instead, we focus on the treatment eﬀects ∆(t,s) discussed in Subsection 4.1.
These treatment eﬀects describe the change in the probability of ﬁnding work within
t periods after becoming unemployed due to entering job search assistance after s
periods (and conditional on still being unemployed at that moment). Using the
timing-of-events model, for an unemployed worker with observed characteristics x










To obtain the population equivalent estimate, we average over the observed char-
acteristics x of all individuals in our sample and integrate over the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity. We use the delta method to compute standard errors
around the treatment eﬀects.
Table 6 shows the estimated employment probabilities and treatment eﬀects.
First, we use the estimation results from the (baseline) timing-of-events model with
permanent homogeneous eﬀects. The table ﬁrst shows the eﬀect of entering job
search training after three months on employment after four and six months. The
upper panel of the table shows that about 30% of the individuals leave unemploy-
ment within three months of starting to collect beneﬁts. Without job search assis-
tance almost 39% of the individuals ﬁnd work within four months and about 52%
within six months. If individuals are assigned to job search assistance after three
months, the employment probability after four months reduces to around 36% and
to almost 47% after six months. For s = 3 the treatment eﬀects ∆(t,s) thus equal
−0.037 and −0.081 for t = 4 and t = 6, respectively. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀects on employment for people entering job search assistance immedi-
ately and after six months. Immediately entry in job search assistance reduces the
reemployment probability after six months by 0.108. Entering the program after six
months reduces the employment rate after nine months by 0.066 and after 12 month
by 0.096.
The second to fourth panel of Table 6 show the estimated models for the diﬀerent
groups. For low-skilled workers the eﬀects are negative but insigniﬁcant. For both
other groups participation in job search assistance signiﬁcantly reduces the proba-
bility of being employed. The treatment eﬀects are about the same for individuals
above and below age 50. However, reemployment rates are much lower for individ-
uals above age 50. Therefore, one might argue that individuals above age 50 suﬀer
20Table 6: Average treatment eﬀects for diﬀerent subsamples and model speciﬁcations.
(s = 3,t = 4) (s = 3,t = 6) (s = 0,t = 6) (s = 6,t = 9) (s = 6,t = 12)
Full Sample (baseline model)
Y ∗
0,s 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.521 0.521
(0.008) (0.008) (–) (0.008) (0.008)
Y ∗
0,t 0.388 0.521 0.521 0.637 0.716
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.362 0.465 0.414 0.606 0.670
(0.009) (0.013) (0.024) (0.009) (0.010)
∆(s,t) −0.037∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.096∗∗
(0.008) (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.022)
Low-skilled workers
Y ∗
0,s 0.102 0.102 0.000 0.163 0.163
(0.016) (0.016) (–) (0.020) (0.020)
Y ∗
0,t 0.120 0.163 0.163 0.252 0.357
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.050)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.117 0.153 0.137 0.237 0.328
(0.016) (0.019) (0.0327) (0.020) (0.023)
∆(s,t) −0.003 −0.011 −0.025 −0.017 −0.035
(0.005) (0.016) (0.036) (0.027) (0.053)
Under age 50 and not low skilled
Y ∗
0,s 0.388 0.388 0.000 0.653 0.653
(0.010) (0.010) (–) (0.010) (0.010)
Y ∗
0,t 0.493 0.653 0.653 0.778 0.848
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.460 0.583 0.519 0.743 0.803
(0.013) (0.024) (0.048) (0.016) (0.019)
∆(s,t) −0.054∗∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.134∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.130∗∗
(0.016) (0.037) (0.047) (0.032) (0.034)
Over age 50 and not low skilled
Y ∗
0,s 0.118 0.118 0.000 0.291 0.291
(0.027) (0.027) (–) (0.025) (0.025)
Y ∗
0,t 0.186 0.291 0.291 0.393 0.488
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.043)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.147 0.197 0.138 0.336 0.385
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
∆(s,t) −0.044∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.152∗∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.145∗∗
(0.014) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.038)
Eﬀect dependent on unemployment duration at entering
Y ∗
0,s 0.302 0.302 0.000 0.523 0.523
(0.008) (0.008) (–) (0.008) (0.008)
Y ∗
0,t 0.389 0.523 0.523 0.640 0.716
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.348 0.431 0.341 0.618 0.685
(0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.010) (0.012)
∆(s,t) −0.058∗∗ −0.132∗∗ −0.183∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.065∗
(0.009) (0.023) (0.034) (0.019) (0.027)
Eﬀect dependent on elapsed program duration
Y ∗
0,s 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.522 0.522
(0.008) (0.008) (–) (0.008) (0.008)
Y ∗
0,t 0.388 0.522 0.522 0.637 0.713
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.352 0.456 0.428 0.599 0.670
(0.010) (0.014) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010)
∆(s,t) −0.052∗∗ −0.095∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.089∗∗
(0.011) (0.019) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022)
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
21more from participating in job search assistance.
Next, we considered the model in which the eﬀect of the job search assistance
depends on the elapsed unemployment duration at the start of the program. The
parameter estimates presented in the previous subsection indicated that the pro-
gram’s eﬀect depends on the moment of entry. The treatment eﬀect estimates in
the ﬁfth panel of Table 6 replicate this ﬁnding, showing that job search assistance
has a more negative eﬀect on the exit to work if entry is after three month compared
to after six months. Compared to the model with homogenous constant treatment
eﬀects the estimated treatment eﬀects change substantially. This emphasizes the
importance of controlling for the moment of entry in the program.
The ﬁnal model speciﬁcation involved relating the eﬀect of the program to time
spent in the program. Recall that we did not ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of
diﬀerences between lock-in eﬀect and post-program eﬀects. The ﬁnal panel of Table
6 shows the treatment eﬀects corresponding to this model speciﬁcation. It is not
surprising that the results are not very diﬀerent from the treatment eﬀects in the
baseline model with constant treatment eﬀects.
6 Propensity score methods
The identiﬁcation of the timing-of-events model relies on the no-anticipation assump-
tion, but also requires that hazard rates are proportional. This second assumption
might be restrictive because it imposes a functional form on the model. From the
institutional setting we know that selection is only on observed characteristics. This
was conﬁrmed when estimating the timing-of-events model since we did not ﬁnd
any selection on unobservables. In this section we impose that selection is only on
observables which allows us to relax parametric assumptions.
Selection on observables implies that conditional on observed characteristics,
treatment assignment is independent of potential outcomes. In a setting with on-
going entry in the job search assistance program and a population in which all
unemployed workers are entitled to the program, the conditional independence as-
sumption is given by
(Y
∗
1,t(s) ∀t,s > 0)⊥S|X
In our case the conditional independence assumption is satisﬁed as long as X con-
tains all characteristics known to the external ﬁrm assigning the job search assistance
program. The conditional independence assumption is necessary for matching in-
dividuals entering the program with comparable unemployed workers who did not
participate.
22The conditional independence assumption guarantees that
E[Y
∗
1,t(s)|X] = E[Yt|X,S = s]
The right-hand side takes the expected employment outcomes at t for those individ-
uals treated at s. In a dynamic setting, however, the moment of entry in the program
is only observed for those unemployed workers who actually enter. In particular, for
individuals who left unemployment prior to s without having participated in the job
search assistance program, we do not know if they would belong to the population
with S = s. The usual approach is to consider only individuals who are still unem-
ployed at time s (i.e. Ys = 0), and who did not already enter job search assistance
(i.e. S ≥ s) (e.g. Gerﬁn and Lechner, 2002; Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller, 2008;
and Sianesi, 2004). As in Subsection 4.1 we deﬁne our treatment eﬀect of interest
conditional on Ys = 0 and S = s.
Imposing only the conditional independence assumption does not guarantee that
E[Y ∗
1,t(s)|X,Ys = 0] equals E[Yt|X,Ys = 0,S = s]. This can be illustrated by the
following example. Assume that potential outcomes depend on the observables
X and some other individual characteristics U, i.e. Y ∗
1,t(s;X,U). The timing of
entry into job search assistance only depends on X, i.e. S(X), so the conditional
independence assumption is satisﬁed. But there can still be dynamic selection if,
for example, unemployed workers anticipate entry into the program and intensify
job search eﬀort. Within the stock of individuals who survive in unemployment
for s periods, those who start job search assistance at s will then have diﬀerent
characteristics than those who enter later. Ridder (1984) showed that in a stock
sample, for example Ys = 0, the distribution of unobserved characteristics U depends
on observed characteristics X. This implies that in case of anticipation at s, the
moment of entering treatment S is no longer independent of U, i.e. S(X,U|Ys =
0) 6= S(X|Ys = 0). The consequence is that if the assumption of no-anticipation does
not hold, a stronger conditional independence assumption is required to estimate
dynamic treatment eﬀects. In particular,
(Y
∗
1,t(s)|Ys = 0 ∀t,s > 0)⊥S|X,U
which implies conditioning on all variables aﬀecting the employment status. In many
cases it is unlikely that data contain all characteristics which aﬀect outcomes. In
our case, this stronger assumption is unlikely to be satisﬁed because our data are
not exceptionally rich on individual characteristics.
Because the moment of entry in the job search assistance program S is a contin-
uous process and we want to estimate the eﬀect of entry in the program at a speciﬁc
moment, we need to discretize time to obtain a group of unemployed workers enter-
ing at S = s. Let τ denote the unit of time. This implies that for all unemployed
23workers observed to enter the program between s and s + τ we should ﬁnd com-
parable controls. We use the propensity score ps(X) to match unemployed workers
entering job search assistance at s with those not entering at s. The propensity
score is given by
ps(X) = Pr(S < s + τ|Ys = 0;S ≥ s;X)
In the baseline case we take the unit of time τ equal to 30 days. The advantage
of choosing τ relatively large is that it makes the size of the treatment group sub-
stantial, so more observations are used in the estimation. The disadvantage is that
information is lost when aggregating time. In the sensitivity analyses we vary τ to
get some idea about the robustness of the results.
We estimate the propensity score using a logit speciﬁcation. As explanatory
variables in the logit speciﬁcation we use the same covariates as included in the
timing-of-events model, so gender, a polynomial in age, the logarithm of the pre-
unemployment wage and an indicator for being a low-skilled worker. As controls
we take all untreated individuals whose propensity score diﬀers less than 0.025 from
the propensity score of the treated individual. If there are multiple controls for a
single treated individual we weight the observations using a kernel with bandwidth
0.005.5
We checked the support of the propensity scores for the treated and controls.
We ﬁnd that the distribution of propensity scores change with s, as the decision
to assign unemployed workers to job search assistance changes over the duration
of unemployment. However, we do not ﬁnd diﬀerences in the support between
individuals actually entering job search assistance and those not entering.
In Subsection 4.1 we mentioned that within the control group there might be
unemployed workers observed to enter job search assistance between s + τ and
t. Sianesi (2004) modiﬁes the treatment eﬀect, such that it becomes the eﬀect of
entering at s compared to later, which has the disadvantage that the treatment eﬀect
depends on the process of future entry into treatment. Lechner (1999) suggests to
simulate the timing of entry for those individuals for which the moment of treatment
entry is missing (and then remove the treatment and control observations with a
simulated treatment between s and t). However, this implies some conditioning on
future outcomes. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) advocate the use of duration
models in discrete time. We follow Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2008) who
combine a matching approach with estimating survivor functions based on duration
models.
5Most of our results are robust against the choice of matching algorithm. For example, nearest-
neighbor matching gives in many cases very similar results.
24The treatment eﬀect ∆(t,s) can we written as
∆(t,s) = E[Y
∗
1,t(s)|S = s,Ys = 0] − E[Y
∗
0,t|S = s,Ys = 0]
Since there is no right-censoring for the treatment group, we can estimate E[Y ∗
1,t(s)|S =
s,Ys = 0] by the fraction of individuals who found work before t having received
treatment between s and s + τ. Within the matched control group we have to deal
with observed entry in the treatment between s + τ and t. The no-anticipation as-
sumption and the conditional independence assumption guarantee that conditional
on X all entry in the job search assistance program can be treated as independent
right-censoring of the exit from unemployment. To estimate the counterfactual out-
come it is thus crucial to condition on the observed characteristics X. Therefore,
we apply the estimator
d E[Y ∗
0,t|S = s,Ys = 0,X] = 1 −
t Y
z=s+τ
d Pr(Yz = 0|S > z,Yz−τ = 0,X)
In our empirical analyses we use logit speciﬁcations for the survival probabilities
Pr(Yz = 0|S > z,Yz−τ = 0,X). In particular, to minimize functional form assump-
tion, we estimate for each z a separate logit model.
A ﬁnal issue is the computation of the standard errors. These must account for
various sources of uncertainty around the treatment eﬀects. The ﬁrst source of un-
certainty comes from the matching procedure. To estimate the variance generated
by the matching we follow Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2008) and apply sub-
sampling. Additionally, there is variation because the survivor functions for both
the treatment and the matched control group are based on estimated Logit speci-
ﬁcations. We can use the Delta method to estimate the variance of these separate
survivor functions and the resulting treatment eﬀect for a given matched sample.
We add both variances to estimate the variance of the treatment eﬀect.
6.1 Treatment eﬀects
Table 7 shows the estimation results for the propensity score matching approach.
The ﬁrst panel of the table shows the results for the baseline case. As in the
timing-of-events model, we ﬁnd negative treatment eﬀects for all ﬁve treatment
eﬀects. However, in none of the cases are the treatment eﬀects signiﬁcant. The
main reason for the insigniﬁcance are the relatively high standard errors, which
are caused by estimating the logit functions underlying the untreated outcomes.
Furthermore, the standard errors in the third column reﬂect the small sample of
entrances into training during the ﬁrst month of unemployment. The use of the
logit functions is necessary to account for right-censoring due to later entry in the
25Table 7: Results from propensity score methods.
(s = 3,t = 4) (s = 3,t = 6) (s = 0,t = 6) (s = 6,t = 9) (s = 6,t = 12)
Baseline model
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.393 0.384 0.668 0.710
(0.041) (0.080) (0.315) (0.079) (0.121)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.348 0.222 0.620 0.702
(0.013) (0.024) (0.155) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054 −0.065 −0.162 −0.110 −0.019
(0.043) (0.084) (0.350) (0.089) (0.132)
No heterogeneity in exit probabilities
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.396 0.403 0.669 0.711
(0.024) (0.034) (0.201) (0.051) (0.066)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.348 0.222 0.620 0.702
(0.013) (0.024) (0.152) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054∗ −0.069 −0.181 −0.113 −0.021
(0.027) (0.042) (0.251) (0.064) (0.085)
Ignoring later entry in treatment
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.398 0.335 0.661 0.688
(0.024) (0.030) (0.166) (0.045) (0.049)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.342 0.222 0.620 0.701
(0.013) (0.020) (0.152) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054∗ −0.080∗ −0.113 −0.094 0.028
(0.027) (0.037) (0.223) (0.060) (0.072)
Excluding later treated from control group
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.409 0.353 0.689 0.704
(0.024) (0.033) (0.168) (0.049) (0.054)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.338 0.222 0.620 0.701
(0.013) (0.019) (0.152) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054∗ −0.103∗∗ −0.131 −0.160∗ −0.008
(0.027) (0.039) (0.225) (0.065) (0.080)
Matching taken over 30 day interval [s,s + 30).
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Matching and Logit functions include the same covariates as the timing of events model.
26program, which is only independent of the exit from unemployment conditional on
the individual characteristics X. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) do not discuss
including covariates in the exit probabilities. In the second panel of the table we
follow this approach. This hardly aﬀects the estimates for the average potential
untreated outcomes Y ∗
0,t and the treatment eﬀects ∆(s,t). The standard errors are,
however, reduced substantially.
Most complications are caused by unemployed workers entering job search as-
sistance between s + τ and t, which confounds the deﬁnition of the control group.
Sianesi (2004) suggests to ignore later entry in job search assistance and to include
unemployed workers entering job search assistance between s + τ and t in the con-
trol group. The alternative is to exclude individuals with observed entry in the job
search assistance program between s + τ and t from the evaluation. In the bot-
tom two panels of Table 7 we report the results from both approaches. Standard
errors are reduced compared to the previous results. Furthermore, excluding unem-
ployed workers who receive later treatment seems to generate a larger bias in the
estimated treatment eﬀects than ignoring later entry. This is particularly true for
the treatment eﬀects reported in the second and the fourth column.
When applying the propensity score matching methods we need to discretize
time. Above we ﬁxed the unit of time (τ) to 30 days. In Table 8 we show estimation
results for diﬀerent units of time. Reducing the unit of time, for example, to 15
days causes that sample sizes become too small. Therefore, we focus on increasing
the unit of time to 45 and 90 days. There are two important consequences of
increasing the unit of time. First, treatment eﬀects become more negative. And
second, standard errors reduce mainly because treated and matched control groups
contain more observations. So treatment eﬀects become signiﬁcant and are diﬀerent
from the treatment eﬀects found using smaller units of time. The propensity score
matching method thus lacks in this case robustness against the choice of the unit of
time.
7 Regression discontinuity
Recall that regular workers (i.e. those who are not low-skilled) who are younger
than 50 when becoming unemployed only enter the job search assistance program
after having collected beneﬁts for six months. Unemployed workers 50 years and
older should enter the program immediately after becoming unemployed. We focus
here on these regular unemployed workers and exploit the policy discontinuity at age
50. In Section 3 we showed that there is a substantial diﬀerence in the entry process
in the program between unemployed workers below and above age 50. However,
27Table 8: Estimation results from propensity score matching with diﬀerent units of
time.
(s = 3,t = 4) (s = 3,t = 6) (s = 0,t = 6) (s = 6,t = 9) (s = 6,t = 12)
τ = 30
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.393 0.384 0.668 0.710
(0.041) (0.080) (0.315) (0.079) (0.121)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.348 0.222 0.620 0.702
(0.013) (0.024) (0.155) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054 −0.065 −0.162 −0.110 −0.019
(0.043) (0.084) (0.350) (0.089) (0.132)
τ = 45
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.404 0.267 0.667 0.699
(0.043) (0.091) (0.043) (0.072)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.345 0.067 0.601 0.663
(0.016) (0.031) (0.024) (0.035)
∆(s,t) −0.085 −0.200∗ −0.150∗∗ −0.081
(0.047) (0.096) (0.052) (0.083)
τ = 90
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.426 0.249 0.677 0.713
(0.020) (0.046) (0.024) (0.034)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.335 0.0717 0.598 0.652
(0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.029)
∆(s,t) −0.131∗∗ −0.178∗∗ −0.180∗∗ −0.138∗∗
(0.024) (0.051) (0.034) (0.047)
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
We estimate the matching and Logit functions with the same covariates as in the timing of events model.
28within both groups there is a large variation in the moment of entering the job
search assistance program. The regression-discontinuity design is, therefore, fuzzy
(e.g. Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001).
The analysis of a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design is not straightforward
in a dynamic setting. At the start of their unemployment spell individuals know
that their age aﬀects the entry rate in the program. Forward-looking individuals
may use this information which means being above or below the age threshold
may not be a valid instrument for program entry. This has also been recognized
by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), who criticize the use of instrumental variables
in dynamic settings. Abbring and Van den Berg (2005) argue that an indicator
for being above or below the age threshold is a special regressor rather than an
instrumental variable.
We can either use a continuous-time duration model or we can discretize time
to relax functional-form restrictions. The continuous-time regression-discontinuity
approach ﬁts within the instrumental-variable duration model proposed by Abbring
and Van den Berg (2005). This framework closely follows the timing-of-events model,
but it exploits the policy discontinuity at age 50. The variable indicating if at the
start of unemployment an individual is 50 years or older is a special regressor. This
variable only aﬀects the exit rate from unemployment until the moment of entry in
job search assistance. The intuition is that information about the entry process in
the program is valuable only until someone actually enters the job search assistance
program. Using a mixed proportional hazard rate for exit from unemployment, this
gives the speciﬁcation
θu(t|x,vu,ts) = λu(t)exp(x
0βu + ηu · 50
+ · I(t ≤ ts) + δ · I(t > ts) + vu)
where 50+ is an indicator function for being 50 years or older. Obviously the age of
the individual (at the start of the unemployment spell) is also included in the vector
of individual characteristics x (but again as a polynomial).
The parameter ηu provides some insight into the presence of ex-ante eﬀects of
the job search assistance program. If unemployed workers dislike participation in
job search assistance and have a high risk of being assigned to the program, they
might increase their job search eﬀort to leave unemployment before actually being
assigned to the program. In that case ηu will be positive, since individuals age 50 and
older are more likely to be assigned to job search assistance early during the unem-
ployment spell. The presence of ex-ante eﬀects does not violate the no-anticipation
assumption, which states that individuals should not change their behavior in re-
sponse to knowing the exact moment of entering the program. The ex-ante eﬀect
described by ηu is thus also diﬀerent from, for example, the threat eﬀect estimated
by Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003).
29Regression-discontinuity methods allow for selection on unobservables. There-
fore, like in the timing-of-events method, we jointly model the entry rate into the
job search assistance program which also depends on the variable indicating if the
individual was 50 years or older at the moment of becoming unemployed,
θs(t|x,vs) = λs(t)exp(x
0βs + ηs · 50
+ + vs)
The identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect δ hinges on the mixed proportional
hazard rate structure and the no-anticipation assumption. The policy discontinuity
only identiﬁes the parameter ηu. We parameterize this bivariate duration model
similarly to the timing-of-events model and estimate the model using maximum
likelihood estimation.
We can again try to relax the parametric structure of the model by discretiz-
ing time. To do so we rely on static methods for analyzing a fuzzy regression-
discontinuity design, which translate into an instrumental-variable approach (e.g.








The ﬁrst condition implies that conditional on covariates X the age threshold does
not aﬀect potential outcomes. The second condition implies that the age threshold
has a nontrivial eﬀect on the timing of entering job search assistance. Note that
the continuous-time regression-discontinuity model discussed above violates the ﬁrst
(conditional independence) assumption of the instrumental variable if ηu 6= 0.
Since the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design is an instrumental variables ap-
proach, it measures the eﬀect of participating in job search assistance for the com-




1,t(s)|Ys = 0,X,C = c] − E[Y
∗
0,t|Ys = 0,X,C = c]
We should use the population distribution of X to obtain the population equivalent
of this treatment eﬀect. We follow Imbens and Rubin (1997), who characterize the
marginal outcome distributions for compliers in an instrumental variable setting.
The expected potential treated outcome equals
E[Y
∗
1,t(s)|Ys = 0,X,C = c] =
1
Pr(S = s|50+,Ys = 0,X) − Pr(S = s|50−,Ys = 0,X)
×{Pr(S = s|50
+,Ys = 0,X)E[Yt|S = s,50
+,Ys = 0,X]
− Pr(S = s|50
−,Ys = 0,X)E[Yt|S = s,50
−,Ys = 0,X]}
30and the expected potential untreated outcome is
E[Y
∗
0,t|Ys = 0,X,C = c] =
1
Pr(S = s|50+,Ys = 0,X) − Pr(S = s|50−,Ys = 0,X)
×{Pr(S > s|50
−,Ys = 0,X)E[Yt|S > t,50
−,Ys = 0,X]
− Pr(S > s|50
+,Ys = 0,X)E[Yt|S > t,50
+,Ys = 0,X])
When applying regression-discontinuity estimation we condition on Ys = 0 and
S ≥ s for the same reasons as when using propensity score matching, i.e. for
individuals who left unemployment without having entered the job search assistance
program we do not know S. We also have to maintain the no-anticipation assumption
otherwise the treatment and control groups have diﬀerent processes of dynamic
selection. However, the question arises under which conditions the variable 50+ is
still a valid instrumental variable for treatment at s within the sample Ys = 0 and
S ≥ s. The requirement is that Y ∗
1,t(s) be independent of 50+ conditional on Ys = 0
and S ≥ s. Assume again that potential outcomes depend not only on observables
X, but also on other variables U, so Y ∗
1,t(s;X,U). Furthermore, the entry in job
search assistance also depends on unobservables V and is written as S(50+,X,V ).





0)|Ys = 0,S ≥ s, ∀t,s
0 ≥ s > 0)⊥50
+|X,U,V
This assumption implies that, at each moment s, the instrument is randomly as-
signed within the population of survivors in unemployment who had not yet par-
ticipated in the program. This assumption is stricter than in the continuous-time
model discussed above. But in this case the policy discontinuity actually identiﬁes
the treatment eﬀect, while in the continuous-time model the policy discontinuity
only identiﬁed the parameter ηu.
The implementation of the estimator is not straightforward. In particular, esti-
mating the expectations E[Yt|S > s,50+,Ys = 0,X] and E[Yt|S > t,50−,Ys = 0,X]
is somewhat complicated due to the issue of program entry between s and t. In this
case we follow the same approach as discussed in the previous subsection. So again
we estimate logit models for exit from unemployment for each time interval with
length τ. Of course, this relies on the assumption that, conditional on the covari-
ates X included in the logit speciﬁcations, exit from unemployment is independent
of entry in job search assistance. So again we rely on the conditional independence
assumption.
31Table 9: Continuous-time regression-discontinuity estimates for regular unemployed
















































** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level * signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors given in parenthesis.
32Table 10: Treatment eﬀects using regression discontinuity (unemployed workers be-
tween age 40 and 60).
(s = 3,t = 4) (s = 3,t = 6) (s = 0,t = 6) (s = 6,t = 9) (s = 6,t = 12)
Continuous-time model
Y ∗
0,s 0.179 0.179 0.000 0.381 0.381
(0.012) (0.012) (–) (0.015) (0.015)
Y ∗
0,t 0.257 0.381 0.381 0.490 0.568
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.220 0.294 0.233 0.443 0.494
(0.014) (0.023) (0.041) (0.015) (0.017)
∆(s,t) −0.045∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.148∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.013) (0.032) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046)
Discrete-time model
Y ∗
0,s 0.198 0.198 0.000 0.446 0.446
(0.013) (0.013) (–) (0.020) (0.020)
Y ∗
0,t 0.372 0.687 30.308 2.421 2.806
(0.276) (0.499) (28.410) (5.689) (5.821)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.224 0.268 0.333 0.467 0.582
(0.082) (0.138) (11.168) (2.048) (2.586)
∆(s,t) −0.184 −0.523 −29.975 −3.526 −4.012
(0.285) (0.515) (28.750) (5.811) (6.103)
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
We estimate the matching and Logit functions with the same covariates as in the timing of events model.
7.1 Treatment Eﬀects using Regression-Discontinuity Meth-
ods
When estimating both regression-discontinuity models speciﬁed above we consider
only individuals between age 40 and 60 at the moment of becoming unemployed.
Furthermore, we exclude all low-skilled workers from the analyses. Table 9 shows the
parameter estimates for the continuous-time regression-discontinuity model. The
eﬀect of participating in the job search assistance program is again negative and
signiﬁcant. Individuals age 50 and older are indeed more likely to enter job search
assistance. Also, the exit rate from unemployment is slightly higher for individuals
just above age 50 compared to individuals just below age 50, but this ex-ante eﬀect of
the program is not signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd some dispersion in unobserved heterogeneity
in both hazard rates. The correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms
is 0.11 and very insigniﬁcant.
As in the timing-of-events model, we can translate the estimated hazards into
the treatment eﬀects ∆(s,t). These are shown in the upper panel of Table 10.
The estimated treatment eﬀects are negative and signiﬁcant. In the bottom panel
of the table, we show the same treatment eﬀects estimated using the discrete-time
regression-discontinuity model. As previously in the baseline propensity score model,
we take the unit of time (τ) equal to 30 days. For the treatment eﬀect of entering job
33search assistance after three months (s = 3) we ﬁnd large negative eﬀects, but also
very large standard errors. This is mainly because estimating the potential untreated
outcomes is problematic. When estimating the treatment eﬀect for entering in the
ﬁrst month (s = 0) we again experience the problem of only having a treated
few observations. For entering job search assistance after six months (s = 6), the
estimated treatment eﬀects do not make sense, i.e. the probabilities are outside the
zero to one interval. The main reason is that after six months of unemployment all
individuals should enter the job search assistance program. This implies that our
instrumental variable 50+ loses power when evaluating job search assistance beyond
six months of unemployment. The results in the ﬁnal two columns are thus the
consequence of a weak instruments problem.
8 Comparing the diﬀerent methods
In the previous sections we provided results for the diﬀerent estimation methods.
In this section we brieﬂy compare these results. We ignore the results from the
discrete-time regression discontinuity model, because these results suﬀered from too
few observations, and, therefore, estimation results were very imprecise. In Table
11 we summarize the eﬀects of participating in the job search assistance program
obtained using the diﬀerent methods. All methods show negative treatment eﬀects
for all cases.
The results of the baseline timing-of-events model are relatively close to the
results from the continuous-time regression-discontinuity model. This is not very
surprising since both models estimate a permanent homogeneous treatment eﬀect.
However, the subsamples used in the estimation diﬀer between both analyses. In
the timing-of-events model we considered the full sample, while in the regression-
discontinuity analysis we focused only on unemployed workers between age 40 and
60. The results of the timing-of-events model change somewhat when we allow the
treatment eﬀect to depend on the elapsed unemployment duration when entering
the job search assistance program. The treatment eﬀect becomes more negative for
entry after three months of unemployment and less negative for entry in the program
after six months of unemployment.
The treatment eﬀects obtained from propensity score matching are less precise
than the results from the continuous-time duration models. This is mainly caused by
the substantial reduction in the sample size due to constructing a matched control
group. Recall that for the matched control group we had to estimate exit prob-
abilities conditional on observables to deal with later entry in the program. We
estimated the exit rates using logit models which, due to small sample sizes, pro-
34Table 11: Comparison of results.
(s = 3,t = 4) (s = 3,t = 6) (s = 0,t = 6) (s = 6,t = 9) (s = 6,t = 12)
Timing of events: baseline model
Y ∗
0,s 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.521 0.521
(0.008) (0.008) (–) (0.008) (0.008)
Y ∗
0,t 0.388 0.521 0.521 0.637 0.716
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.362 0.465 0.414 0.606 0.670
(0.009) (0.013) (0.024) (0.009) (0.010)
∆(s,t) −0.037∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.096∗∗
(0.008) (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.022)
Timing of events: eﬀect dependent on unemployment duration at entering
Y ∗
0,s 0.302 0.302 0.000 0.523 0.523
(0.008) (0.008) (–) (0.008) (0.008)
Y ∗
0,t 0.389 0.523 0.523 0.640 0.716
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.348 0.431 0.341 0.618 0.685
(0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.010) (0.012)
∆(s,t) −0.058∗∗ −0.132∗∗ −0.183∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.065∗
(0.009) (0.023) (0.034) (0.019) (0.027)
Propensity score matching
Y ∗
0,s 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.563 0.563
(0.011) (0.011) (–) (0.014) (0.014)
Y ∗
0,t 0.360 0.393 0.384 0.668 0.710
(0.041) (0.080) (0.315) (0.079) (0.121)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.322 0.348 0.222 0.620 0.702
(0.013) (0.024) (0.155) (0.037) (0.051)
∆(s,t) −0.054 −0.065 −0.162 −0.110 −0.019
(0.043) (0.084) (0.350) (0.089) (0.132)
Continuous-time regression-discontinuity
Y ∗
0,s 0.179 0.179 0.000 0.381 0.381
(0.012) (0.012) (–) (0.015) (0.015)
Y ∗
0,t 0.257 0.381 0.381 0.490 0.568
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
Y ∗
1,t(s) 0.220 0.294 0.233 0.443 0.494
(0.014) (0.023) (0.041) (0.015) (0.017)
∆(s,t) −0.045∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.148∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.013) (0.032) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046)
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, * signiﬁcance at the 5% level
35duce quite substantial standard errors. The treatment eﬀects from propensity score
matching are, therefore, never signiﬁcant. But the estimated treatment eﬀects are
also somewhat diﬀerent for the propensity score method than for the other meth-
ods. The diﬀerence between methods is not as large as found by Lalive, van Ours
and Zweim¨ uller (2008). However, in their case it is not clear that the conditional
independence assumption is satisﬁed, and violation of this assumption might be an
explanation for the diﬀerence in estimated treatment eﬀect.
Finally, it is interesting to consider entry in the job search assistance program
during the ﬁrst month (s = 0). In this case, there is not yet any dynamic selection
and diﬀerences between methods are thus largely the eﬀect of diﬀerent functional-
form assumptions. For this case again the propensity score methods provides in-
signiﬁcant eﬀects of participating in the treatment, but the parameter estimate is
relatively close to the timing-of-events methods where we allow the treatment ef-
fect to depend on the elapsed unemployment duration when entering the job search
program.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we used diﬀerent methods to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a job search
assistance program for unemployed workers within a dynamic setting. The data
come from a unique institutional setting, which allows for the use of diﬀerent
methods. In particular, we used timing-of-events, propensity score matching and
regression-discontinuity methods. All methods indicate negative (and often sig-
niﬁcant) ex-post eﬀects of participating in job search assistance on the exit from
unemployment.
As stated by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), the identiﬁcation of a treatment
eﬀect within the timing-of-events model hinges on the no-anticipation assumption
and imposes mixed proportional hazard rates. We argue that exploiting a policy
discontinuity or the usual conditional independence assumption cannot replace the
no-anticipation assumption. It is important to stress that whereas papers using
the timing-of-events approach justify the no-anticipation assumption extensively,
this is almost always ignored in papers using other approaches to evaluate dynamic
treatment eﬀects.
The conditional independence assumption can only be used to relax the mixed
proportional hazard rate structure of the timing-of-events model. However, when
applying propensity score matching methods it is necessary to discretize time to
deal with continuous inﬂow into the program. In the empirical analyses we have
shown that our results are not very robust against the choice of the unit of time.
36Furthermore, taking account of later entry in the job search assistance program in
the control group requires a more formal model for exit from unemployment in the
control group. When actually taking account of this type of right-censoring, the
estimators for the treatment eﬀect become much less precise.
Exploiting the regression-discontinuity design within our setting is complicated.
Within the timing-of-events model the policy discontinuity only identiﬁes possible
ex-ante eﬀects of the program which can not be exploited to estimate the eﬀect of
actually participating in the program. This also explains why the estimated treat-
ment eﬀects in this model are close to those in the baseline timing-of-events model.
Relaxing the parametric structure is problematic. First, to estimate dynamic treat-
ment eﬀects using a regression discontinuity requires the absence of ex-ante eﬀects,
which is a stronger requirement than assuming no-anticipation. Furthermore, to
deal with dynamic selection a conditional independence assumption is also required.
Recall that in our application we focus on individuals in the primary education
sector collecting unemployment insurance beneﬁts. Unemployed workers from the
primary school sector diﬀer from other unemployed workers, for example, in com-
position and where they search for new employment. For this group of unemployed
workers we ﬁnd that participating in the job search assistance program does not
stimulate exit from unemployment. The job search assistance program is a general
program provided by commercial training agencies and many unemployed workers in
the private sector also participate in this program. Our results are only informative
on how this job search assistance program aﬀects the exit rate from unemployment
of unemployed workers in the primary school sector. The poor performance might
be the consequence of a mismatch between the program and this group of unem-
ployed workers rather than the program being ineﬀective in general. For example,
the program might press participants to search for work in the general labor mar-
ket, while unemployed workers in the primary education sector mainly search for
teaching jobs at primary schools.
As a consequence of the results discussed in this paper, the job search assistance
program has been modiﬁed in a number of ways. First, after two months of unem-
ployment there is now an introductory meeting in which individuals are informed
about the program. The Participation Fund indicates that this reduces the resis-
tance to participate in the program. In the new setup, individuals only enter the
program after having collected beneﬁts for eight months. This is later than in the
previous setup and there is no diﬀerence anymore for individuals below and above
age 50. The previous results indicate that the program eﬀect is less negative if entry
is later during the unemployment spell and expenditures also decreased because less
individuals actually enter the program. Finally, the job search assistance program
now has some voluntary elements, so individuals have some discretion to choose
37their degree of assistance.
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